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play in the sand piles adjoining the pond. The court held that the de-
fendant would not be held liable even if the pond was an attractive
nuisance for the trespass was not induced by the allurement of the pond.
The court went on to say that it is necessary that the dangerous condition
be so located as to attract children from some place where they may be
expected to be, and that the defendant could not be held liable for a
dangerous condition which could only be found by children going upon
his premises as trespassers.
What then is the conclusion to be reached after a study of the Illinois
decisions? It seems that the Illinois courts have been reluctant to follow
the negligence theory, which insists that the element of attraction should
not be essential in determining liability. The allurement theory of the
Burke case remains strong today, as evidenced by the holding in Wood v.
Consumers Co.;32 this theory is consistent with the tendency of the ma-
jority of Illinois decisions to limit and to apply cautiously the attractive
nuisance doctrine rather than to extend it. The negligence theory of the
Ramsay case will be kept in reserve by the courts, and will be applied only
in extreme factual situations in which the occupier of land has been ob-
viously negligent to the extent almost of willful and wanton conduct.
CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY CLAUSES
AND THEIR INTERPRETATION
A common but perplexing problem in the 'insurance field is the con-
struction of terms and conditions embodied in the change of beneficiary
clause within the usual contract of life or accident insurance. Upon first
impression, it would seem that the rights and duties of the parties are
governed by the terms of the contract. Ordinarily, this assumption would
be proper, but in the light of some recent decisions which construe the
same or substantially the same language to have different meanings, the
assumption weakens considerably.
Generally, the right to change a- beneficiary depends on whether the
insured has reserved this right in the contract of insurance. Unless such
right is reserved, the beneficiary has an absolute, vested interest which
cannot be revoked.' Today, most contracts of insurance reserve the right
to change beneficiary by giving the insured an irrevocable option to
change the beneficiary at will.2
23 Ibid.
I Kurgan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 340 Ill. App. 178, 91 N.E. 2d 620 (1950); West v.
Pollard, -02 Ga. 549, 43 S.E. 2d 509 (1947); Hintz v. Hintz, 78 F. 2d 432 (C.A. 7th,
1935); Arnold v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 228 Fed. 157, (S.D. Iowa, i9iS); Bil-
bro v. Jones, io, Ga. 6i, 29 S.E. ;i8 (1897).
2 Stone v. Stephens, 155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N.E. ad 766 (1951); Kurgan v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 340 Ill. App. 178, 91 N.E. 2d 62o (1950); West v. Pollard, 202 Ga. 549, 43 S.E.
2d 509 (1947); Parks v. Parks, 288 Ky. 435, 156 S.W. 2d 480 (941); Atkinson v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 114 Ohio St. 3o9, 1So N.E. 748 (1926).
COMMENTS
The usual change of beneficiary clause provides that upon filling out
proper company forms, and sending them to the home office together
with the policy, the beneficiary may be changed but that no change shall
be effective until the policy is endorsed by the company. Courts are
divided as to whether these clauses are to be construed strictly or liberally.
Under the strict compliance view, all conditions and terms of the clause
must be fulfilled to effect a change. This point of view was originally
reinforced by considering the type of interest the beneficiary acquired at
the moment of contract. If, as the early cases held, the beneficiary had a
vested interest, the interest could not be defeated without strict compli-
ance.3 The majority of courts today say that the interest of the beneficiary
is a mere expectancy or a contingent interest which never becomes vested
until the death of the insured. 4 The better holding, today, is that the
beneficiary does have a right which may, however, be defeated by an
exercise of the reserved power of the insured.5
Today, many courts still use the strict compliance theory in name but
not always with the effect of presenting an effective change of beneficiary
in every case of a failure to complete literally all the formal requirements
set out in the change of beneficiary clause. A number of courts hold that
since the clause was intended for the convenience and benefit of the
insurer, it is unnecessary that it be strictly complied with if the insurer
waives its protection., The insurer may waive by interpleading in an
action brought to obtain the proceeds of the policy and paying the funds
into court, or by agreeing to pay the substituted beneficiary, or by
actually paying such beneficiary.7 There is a split of opinion as to when
3 Freund v. Freund, 218 Ill. 189, 75 N.E. 925 (1905); Arnold v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc., 228 Fed. 157 (S.D. Iowa, 1915); Virgin v. Marwick, 97 Me. 578, 55
Adt. 520 (1903); Bilbro v. Jones, oz Ga. 61, 29 SF_ i18 (1897).
4 Cook v. Cook, 17 Cal. 2d 639, 111 P. 2d 322 (194); Johnson v. Johnson, 139 F.
zd 930 (CA. 5th, 1943); Hintz v. Hintz, 78 F. zd 432 (C.A. 7th, 1935); Glenn v.
Stephens, 92 N.E. 2d 29 (CA. Ohio, 1950); Stone v. Stephens, 155 Ohio St. 595, 99
N.E. 2d 766 (195); Young v. American Standard Life Ins. Co., 398 Ill. 565, 76 N.E.
2d 5o1 (1948); Katz v. Ohio Nat. Bank, 127 Ohio St. 531 , 191 N.E. 782 (1934); Town-
send v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 163 Iowa 713, 144 N.W. 574 (1913);
Pedron v. Olds, 193 Ark. 1026, 105 S.W. 2d 70 (1937); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., v.
Dinzik, 141 N.J. Eq. 336, S7 A. zd 247 (Ch., i948); Foster v. Gile, 50 Wis. 603, 7 N.W.
555 (188o).
5 West v. Pollard, 2oz Ga. 549, 43 S.E. 2d 509 (1947); Parks v. Parks, z88 Ky. 435,
156 S.W. 2d 480 (1941).
6 Kurgan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 340 IMl. App. 178, 91 N.E. 2d 62o (1950); Stone v.
Stephens, 155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N.E. 2d 766 (1951); Johnson v. Johnson, 139 F. zd 930
(CA. 5th, 1943); Hintz v. Hintz, 78 F. zd 432 (C.A. 7 th, 1935); Atkinson v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 114 Ohio St. io9, i5o N.E. 748 (1926); Sun Life Assurance Co. v.
Williams, 284 Ill. App. 222, 1 N.E. 2d 247 (1936); Parks v. Parks, 288 Ky. 435, 156
S.W. 2d 48o (i94i).
7 Young v. American Standard Life Ins. Co., 398 111. 565, 76 NE. 2d 501 (1948);
Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Williams, 284 Ill. App. 222, 1 N.E. 2d 247 (1936); Hoskins
v. Hoskins, 231 Ky. 5, 20 S.W. zd 1o29 (1929); White v. White, 194 N.Y. Supp. 114
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the waiver must be made. Generally, the company can waive the benefit
intended by interpleading, but a few courts hold that interpleading cannot
waive any provision of the clause after the death of the insured since the
beneficiary's right is vested.8 The reasoning of these courts is that inter-
pleading after death is merely a procedural device to allow the contesting
parties to have their rights determined by the court.9
. In Young v. American Standard Life Insurance Co.,10 the insured re-
quested a change of beneficiary in a writing which ended by stating, "It
being understood that such change shall not become effective until en-
dorsement has been made." The insured died three hours before the
original request reached the company. The insurance company inter-
pleaded in the case. The court, in holding that a change had not been
effected, reasoned that although the conditions could have been waived
by the company by interpleading, this was not possible here since the
insured himself had set up the condition precedent of endorsement by the
company.
The Illinois courts are not quick to allow waiver. In Kurgan v. Pruden-
tial Insurance Co.," the insured, while in a hospital, desired to have her
beneficiary changed from her husband to her son. The insurance agent
obtained the forms and requested the policy since the terms of the con-
tract required endorsement. The insured signed the forms but did not
send them or the policy to the insurer. Upon suit to recover the proceeds
of the policy, the insurer insisted that no change in beneficiary had been
effected. The court agreed with this contention and held that where the
insurer does not waive the conditions, it can insist upon strict compliance.
The majority of courts follow a more liberal view, also known as the
substantial compliance theory, and allow recovery to the substituted
beneficiary even though the express conditions in the contract are not
literally fulfilled.
Under this view the insured may change the beneficiary of his insurance
policy even though he has not complied strictly with the terms of the
contract: (i) if the insured has manifested an intent and desire to change,
and (2) if the insured has done all that is reasonably within his power to
effect such a change. 12 A further refinement o:f this rule, made by some
(S. Ct., 1922); cf. Rumsey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 59 Colo. 71, 147 Pac. 337 (1915)
in which the court refused to allow waiver where the company had continuously in-
sisted upon strict compliance.
8 Johnson v. Johnson, 139 F. 2d 930 (C.A. 5th, 1943); Wannamaker v. Stroman, t67
S.C. 484, t66 S.E. 6zi (1932).
9 Johnson v. Johnson, 139 F. 2d 930 (C.A. Sth, 1943).
10 398 111.565, 76 N.E. 2d 501 (1948).
11 340 Ill. App. 178, 91 N.E. zd 62o (1950).
12 Atkinson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 114 Ohio St. IO9, 15o N.E. 748 (1926);
Cook v. Cook, 17 Cal. 2d 639, I1 P. 2d 322 (941); Bradley v. United States, 143 F. zd
573 (C.A. ioth, 1944.).
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courts, is that not only must the insured have done all that he reasonably
could, but that only a ministerial act remains to be done by the insured.13
On the other hand, where only a ministerial act remains, as for example
the endorsement of the policy, some courts insist that the insurer cannot
refuse to change the beneficiary.' 4 Even the most liberal courts agree that
mere expressed purpose or intent alone is not sufficient to be regarded as
coming within the theory of substantial compliance.15
The substantial compliance theory has allowed recovery also where
physical impossibility prevented the insured from complying with the
terms of the contract.1 However, where the insured had claimed his
wife would not return his insurance policy, the court held that substantial
compliance was not present because there was no showing, by evidence,
of a demand and refusal, and that, therefore, the insured had not done
everything reasonably within his power. 17
Also under this physical impossibility view of substantial compliance,
fall the "war risk" cases.18 In Finnerty v. Cook,19 the insured, a prisoner
of war in Japan, sent two postcards to his mother asking her to have his
beneficiary changed. The contract of insurance contained the usual pro-
visions which could not be carried out because no business correspondence
was allowed by the Japanese authorities. The court held sufficient sub-
stantial compliance.
Another perplexing problem is caused by an attempted change of
beneficiary by a valid will. If the contract provides for a change by the
last will and testament, the courts obviously give effect to that intent.20
All courts also allow a disposition of the proceeds of a policy by will
where the insured's estate is the beneficiary of the insurance. 21 This type
1' Young v. American Standard Life Ins. Co., 398 Il. S65, 76 N.E. 2d 5ox (1948);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Cooney, 339 I1. App. 575,9o N.E. 2d 567 (1950); Equita-
ble Life Assurance Soc. v. McClelland, 85 F. Supp. 688 (W.D. Mich., I949).
14Boehne v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 224 Minn. 57, 28 N.W. ad S4 (1947)
15 Spurlock v. Spurlock, 271 Ky. 70, "'i S.W. 2d 443 (1937); Donahey v. Sweigart
336 M. App. 366, 84 N.E. ad 170 (1949); West v. Pollard, aoa Ga. 549, 43 S.E. ad 509
(1947).
16 Harris v. Metropolitan Life Ins. CO., 330 Mich. 24, 46 N.W. 2d 448 (1951) where
insured was sick in bed and near death; O'Connell v. Brody, 136 Conn. 475, 72 A. ad
493 (195o) where wife refused to return policy; Imler v. Williams, 196 Ark. 287, 117
S.W. 2d 1053 (1938) where policy was in safety deposit box.
170'Connell v. Brody, 136 Conn. 475, 72 A. ad 493 (1950).
'
8 Finnerty v. Cook, 118 Co1. 310, 195 P. 2d 973 0948); United Services Life Ins.
Co. v. Farr, 6o F. Supp. 829 (S.D.N.Y., 1945); Woods v. United States, 69 F. Supp.
76o (S.D. Ala., 1947); Benson v. Benson, iz, Okla. 151, 256 Pac. 912 (1927).
19 ii8 Co1. 310, 195 P. zd 973 (1948).
20 Cook v. Cook, 17 Cal. 2d 639, 111 P. ad 322 (1941); Baldwin v. Begley, 185 IlL i8o,
56 N.E. 1o65 (i9oo); High Court Catholic Order of Forresters v. Malloy, 169 111. 58,
48 N.E. 392 (i89); Consult 6a A.L.R. 940, 943 (1929).
21 Eickelkamp v. Carl, 193 Ark. 1155, 104 S.W. ad 814 (1937); Cook v. Cook, 17 Cal.
ad 639, III P. 2d 322 (194); Modem Woodmen of America v. Scott, aoi 111. App.
144 0916).
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of situation is not truly a change of beneficiary, but merely a designation
of how the proceeds of the insured's estate are to be disposed of after his
death.
Most courts which recognize the substantial compliance theory will not
allow change of beneficiary by a valid will if such right is not given by
the policy.22 The courts reason that the right to change the beneficiary is
a personal one which must be exercised during insured's lifetime, and
thus cannot be exercised by a will, which speaks from the time of testa-
tor's death.23 The same reasoning also accounts for the strict attitude of
the courts in determining that once the beneficiary's interest is vested, it
cannot be revoked unless in strict compliance with the terms of the con-
tract.24 Other bases for holding a will ineffective are the uncertainty
created for insurance companies who might subject themselves to double
liability,2r and the belief that if a will was effective for this purpose, the
companies might delay paying the claim until either the matter was liti-
gated or the will probated.
26
However, there are cases which hold a will effective to change a bene-
ficiary even though the contract does not so expressly provide.27 Towrn-
send v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York 28 held that if the clause
did not prohibit change of beneficiary by a valid will, then such method
was impliedly authorized. Some courts hold that a valid will alone, al-
though not communicated or directed to insurer, is effective to change
the beneficiary.29
An important distinction which may have a bearing in the future is
22 Quinlan v. Quinlan, 293 Ky. 565, 169 S.W. 2d 617 (1943); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Mallory, 291 Mich. 701, 289 N.W. 302 (1939); Virgin v. Marwick, 97 Me. 578, 55 At.
520 (1903).
23 Stone v. Stephens, 155 Ohio St. 595, 99 N.E. 2d 766 (1951); Cook v. Cook, 17
Cal. 2d 639, 111 P. 2d 322 (1941).
24 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Dinzik, i41 N.J. Eq. 336, 57 A. 2d 247 (Ch., 1948);
Johnson v. Johnson, 139 F. 2d 930 (C.A. 5th, 1943).
25 Wannamaker v. Stroman, 167 S.C. 484, 166 S.E. 6z1 (1932); Parks v. Parks, 288
Ky. 435, 156 S.W. 2d 480 (1941).
26 Dogariu v. Dogariu, 306 Mich. 392, i N.. 2d 1 (1943); Parks v. Parks, 288
Ky. 435, 156 S.A. 2d 480 (1941).
27 Eickelkamp v. Carl, t93 Ark. 1155, 104 S.W. 2d 814 (1937); Pedron v. Olds, 193
Ark. io26, 105 S.W. 2d70 (1937); Imler v. Williams, 196 Ark. 287, 117 S.W. 2d 1053
(1938); Townsend v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York, 163 Iowa 713, 144
NAY. 574 (1913); Benson v. Benson, 125 Okla. 151, z6 Pac. 91z (1927); Hunter v.
Hunter, oo S.C. 517, 84 S.E. 18o (1915); cf. Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v.
Dinoff, 72 F. Supp. 723 (Kan., 1947) where attested instrument, which was not a
will, was held sufficient.
28 163 Iowa 713, 144 N.W. 574 (1913)"
20 Pedron v. Olds, 193 Ark. 1o6, io5 S.W. 2d 70 (1937); Hunter v. Hunter, ioo
S.C. 517, 84 S.E. 18o (1915); Townsend v. Fidelity and Casualty Co.- of New York,
163 Iowa 713, 144 N.W. 574 (1913).
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that most cases which have held a will ineffective do so not because the
change was attempted by will, but because the will was not in substantial
compliance with the terms of the contract.3 0
The early Illinois decisions followed the strict compliance theory,31
but have accepted substantial compliance when the insured has done all
that was reasonably within his power, and only a ministerial act remains. 2
However, since the Illinois courts hold that the terms and conditions of
the clause are for the protection and convenience of the insurer, the
company, if it does not waive such right by interpleading, can insist upon
strict compliance. 3 As to a will effecting a change, Illinois courts have
allowed the change where the policy expressly provides, 34 but where the
contract said a change other than by provisions in the contract was null
and void, the will was held ineffective. 5
THE NOTARY PUBLIC-A FORGOTTEN POWER
The duties of the notary public are numerous' and well known in our
society, and the exercise of these functions a common occurrence. Yet the
careless and unconcerned way in which these acts are often performed
indicates that many fail to appreciate the seriousness of the notary's func-
tion. It is the purpose of this comment to examine some of the legal re-
sults which flow from the proper or improper performance of the func-
tion of a notary public.
The most common act which the notary performs, and out of which
80Smith v. Smith, 172 F. 2d 399 (C.A. 8th, 1949); Quinlan v. Quinlan, 293 Ky. 565,
i6 9 S.W. zd 617 (1943); Bennett v. Bennett, 70 Ohio App. 187, 45 N.E. 2d 614 (1942);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Mallory, 291 Mich. 7oi, 289 N.W. 302 (1939); Nance v. Hil-
liard, 1o F. 2d 957 (C.A. 8th, 1939); cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Dinzik, 141
NJ. Eq. 336, 57 A. 2d 287 (Ch., 1948) where a change was attempted by a certified
instrument.
3' Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Williams, 284 Ill. App. 22, 1 N.E. 2d 247 (1936); Equi-
table Life Assurance Society v. Stilley, 271 Ill. App. 283 (1933); Freund v. Freund,
218 111. 189, 75 N.E. 925 (1905); McEldowney v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 37 IM.
66, 179 N.E. 520 (1931).
32 Young v. American Standard Life Ins. Co., 398 Ill. 565, 76 N.E. zd 5o (1948);
Kavanagh v. New England M.L. Ins. Co., 238 Ill. App. 72 (1925).
38 Kurgan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 340 IMl. App. 178, 91 NZE. 2d 620 (1950); Young v.
American Standard Life Ins. Co., 398 Ill. 565, 76 N.E. 2d 501 (1948).
34 Baldwin v. Begley, i85 Ill. i8o, 56 N.E. io65 (igoo).
35 Modem Woodmen of America v. Scott, 201 Ill. App. 144 (1916).
1 The notary public is "a public officer whose function is to administer oaths; to
attest and certify, by his hand and official seal, certain classes of documents in order
to give them credit and authenticity in foreign jurisdictions; to take acknowledge-
ments of deeds and other conveyances, and certify the same; and to perform certain
official acts, chiefly in commercial matters, such as the protesting of notes and bills,
the noting of foreign drafts, and waive protests in cases of loss or damage." Black's
Law Dictionary, p. 1257 ( 3d ed., 1933).
